



\* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI  
% Order reserved on : 20 March 2025  
Order pronounced on: 24 March 2025

+ CONT.CAS(C) 1472/2024

MAJOR SHUBHRA VERMA .....Petitioner  
Through: Mr. Ankur Chibber & Mr.  
Anshuman Mehrotra, Advs.  
with petitioner in person.

versus

LIEUTENANT GENERAL GURBIRPAL  
SINGH .....Respondent  
Through: Ms. Monika Arora, CGSC with  
Mr. Subhradeep Saha & Mr.  
Prabhat Kumar, Advs.

**CORAM:**  
**HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DHARMESH SHARMA**

### **ORDER**

**REVIEW PET. 19/2025 (For review of judgment dated 16.12.2024) & CM APPL. 2767/2025**

1. This order shall decide the instant petition moved by the applicant/respondent under Section 114 read with order XLVII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 seeking review of the order dated 16.12.2024 passed by this Court in CONT.CAS(C) No.1472/2024 titled as **Major Shubhra Verma v. Lieutenant General Gurbirpal Singh.**

2. A reply has already been filed on behalf of the non-applicant/petitioner and the application is opposed.



### **FACTUAL BACKGROUND:**

3. Briefly stated, the petitioner is a permanent commissioned Whole Time Lady Officer [‘WTLO’], who was appointed in 2006 through the UPSC<sup>1</sup> under the National Cadet Corps (Whole Time Lady Officers Recruitment Rules, 1995 [‘1995 Rules’]. Evidently, her appointment and terms of service are governed by Appendix ‘A’ dated 12.03.1997 and at the time of filing W.P.(C) No.2437/2024 as well as the aforesaid contempt petition, she was serving as the Administrative Officer in the rank of Major with 3 Delhi Girl Battalion, National Cadet Corps [‘NCC’].

4. The petitioner was aggrieved that she was a victim of sexual harassment at the hands of a male officer and had lodged a complaint through the SHE-BOX portal (Ref. No.WCD-24624) on 07.09.2022 regarding alleged misconduct by her Commanding Officer during her posting in Patna.

5. Shorn of unnecessary details, on the recommendations of the group headquarters at Patna, an Internal Complaints Committee [‘ICC’] was constituted which rendered its finding *vide* report/recommendation dated 23.09.2023 thereby exonerating the delinquent Commanding Officer of any misconduct. Aggrieved thereof, the non-applicant/petitioner filed the W.P.(C) No.2437/2024 wherein she sought certain specific reliefs, which go as under:

**“W.P.(C) 2437/2024 & CM APPLs. 10009/2024, 10010/2024**

1. The Petitioner has approached this Court with the following prayers:-

(a) issue a writ of certiorari setting aside/quashing the

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<sup>1</sup> Union Public Service Commission



Supplementary Report/Recommendation submitted by ICC on 23.09.2023 (sent to the Petitioner vide covering letter dated 14.12.2023 received by Petitioner on 26.12.2023) and all subsequent orders/departmental inquiry initiated vide convening order dated 19.01.2024; and

(b) issue a writ of mandamus, thereby directing and commanding the Respondent No.3/DG NCC to decide the representation/appeal of the Petitioner dated 14.02.2024 in case has the power/authority to adjudicate;

(c) issue a writ of mandamus, thereby directing and commanding the Respondents to re-constitute a fair and impartial ICC as per the mandate of Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 preferably by Respondent No.1 in Delhi.”

6. Suffice to state that the learned Single Judge of this Court after considering the entire gamut of the matter passed the following directions.

“4. The Respondents are directed to consider the aforesaid representation given by the Petitioner as an appeal under Section 18 of the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Rules, 2013. The Petitioner is permitted to raise additional submissions, if any, within a period of one week from today.

5. The Respondents are directed to forward the appeal to the Appellate Authority constituted under the CCS Rules which according to the learned Counsel for the Respondents is applicable on the Petitioner. The Appellate Authority is directed to decide the appeal within a period of four weeks from the date of receiving the appeal.

6. With these observations, the writ petition is disposed of, along with pending application(s), if any.

7. Liberty is granted to the Petitioner to approach this Court again for any further directions as may be required, if any.”

7. It is borne out from the record that pursuant to the aforesaid order, the petitioner wrote a letter dated 14.02.2024 and another one



dated 20.02.2024 to the DG, NCC. It is also brought out in the earlier letter dated 14.02.2024, she had requested for a personal hearing/interview consequent to directions of this Court for decision on her representation while in the second letter dated 20.02.2024, she requested the DG, NCC that her appeal be referred to the Appellate Authority constituted under the CCS Rules in terms of Section 18 of the POSH Act. It appears that she received a reply dated 10.04.2024 from the DG, NCC whereby her representation was considered para-wise and the same stood rejected.

8. Aggrieved thereof, she preferred the instant contempt petition which was decided by this Court *vide* impugned order dated 16.12.2024. In summary, this Court accepted the plea canvassed on behalf of the non-applicant/petitioner that although the DG, NCC acts as the Senior Commanding Officer with respect to the WTLO, however, he is not vested with the status of the Disciplinary Authority or the Appellate Authority in respect of Group-A employees. This Court relied on the Appendix 'A' to the NCC order dated December, 1980 wherein it is stipulated that in service disciplinary matters concerning the imposition of both major or minor penalties for Group-A employees, the Disciplinary Authority shall be the Ministry of Defence and the Appellate Authority shall be the President.

9. Accordingly, this Court held as under:-

“18. The aforesaid Appendix 'A' read vis-à-vis the memorandum dated 02.08.2016 leave no scope for doubt that the DGNCC cannot be classified as the DA. The DGNCC, as the commanding officer, is distinct from the Disciplinary Authority (DA) under Section 18 of the POSH Act. Moreover, the DGNCC's decision in the petitioner's case raises concerns about bias. This is



because the DGNCC supervised the Internal Complaints Committee (ICC) and justified their own decisions in the appeal letter dated 10.04.2024. Furthermore, the petitioner has been denied a fair hearing, and their representation has not been considered by the DA. This omission is a concern, as the DA's role is critical in ensuring a fair and impartial process under the POSH Act. Therefore the impugned decision conveyed vide letter dated 10.04.2024 is *non est* in law.

19. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court finds that the respondents have committed wilful and deliberate disobedience of the directions of this Court vide order dated 19.02.2024 passed in W.P.(C) No.2437/2024, and therefore, they are held guilty of committing contempt of the directions of this Court.

20. To purge themselves of contempt, the respondents are hereby directed to:

- (i) Refer the petitioner's representation to the Disciplinary Authority (DA);
- (ii) Decide on the petitioner's representation after affording her an opportunity to be heard within three weeks from the date of this order.”

### **LEGAL SUBMISSIONS**

10. It was urged by the learned standing counsel for the applicant/respondent that by virtue of Section 44 of the NCC Act, it is provided that the Ministry of Defence, Govt. of India may by order in writing direct that all or any of the powers conferred by the Rules shall, subject to such conditions as specified in the directions, be exercisable by the Directorate General, National Cadet Corps.

11. Learned standing counsel for the respondent referred to the notification dated 09.06.1994 whereby it is provided as under: -

#### **“NOTIFICATION**

S.R.O. 106. In exercise of the powers conferred by rule 40 of the National Cadet Corps (Girls Division) Rules, 1949, the Central Government hereby directs that the powers exercisable by



the Secretary to the Government of India in the Ministry of Defence under clauses (c) and (d) of sub-rule (1) of rule 39 of the said Rules shall be exercised by the Director General, National Cadet Corps.”

Sd/  
(HUKAM CHAND)  
UNDER SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA  
No.5431/Discipline/DGNCC/MS(B)”

12. It was pointed out that as regards summary reduction and punishment, which powers are vested with the Secretary, Ministry of Defence, Govt. of India, in case of punishment *vide* Clauses (c)<sup>2</sup> and (d)<sup>3</sup>, the power is vested with DGNCC in terms of the Circular No.15312/RTIA/1628/NCCHQ/Coord dated 03.07.2024.

13. *Per contra*, Mr. Chibber, learned counsel for the non-applicant/petitioner has urged that the non-applicant/petitioner being a Group-A officer in the rank of a Major, the DGNCC cannot be said to be the Disciplinary Authority or the Appellate Authority and in that regard, he referred to the Rule 14 of the CCS Rules.

### **ANALYSIS AND DECISION**

14. Having heard Ms. Monika Arora, learned standing counsel for the respondent and Mr. Ankur Chibber, learned counsel for the non-applicant/petitioner and on perusal of the record, this Court has no hesitation in holding that there appears to have crept in *an error apparent on the face of the record* in understanding of the relevant circulars applicable to the parties in question.

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<sup>2</sup> Forfeiture of seniority or service for the purpose of promotion for a period not exceeding twelve months

<sup>3</sup> Stoppages of pay and allowances until any proved loss or damage occasioned by the offence for which the offender is charged is made good.



15. First things first, it has been rightly urged by the learned standing counsel for the applicant/respondent that the petitioner herself in the main writ petition *inter alia* had sought relief (b) that her representation dated 14.02.2024 be considered by the respondent no.3/DG, NCC, and which relief was eventually granted by the learned Single Judge of this Court. The plea that, the DG, NCC was not the Disciplinary Authority or the Appellate Authority, was taken subsequently, which is not made out, for the fact that the petitioner was appointed in terms of Memorandum dated 26.05.2006 in terms of the provision of SRO 171 dated 12.07.1995 and the Clause (vii) of the Memorandum provided as under:-

“(vii). For the purpose of all other service conditions & benefits such as leave, Uniforms, Traveling Concessions, Medical Treatment, GPF, Pay & Allowances, Age of superannuation, Discipline & Service liability, she will be governed by the terms and conditions as contained in Appendix ‘A’ to Govt. of India, Ministry of Defence letter No.5431/WTLO/DGNCC/PC/TCS/MS(A)/7(C)/D(GS-VI), dated 12 Mar 1997, as amended from time to time. For the purpose of grant of pension etc. she will be governed by CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972, as amended from time to time. In addition, she will be governed by all such rules and regulations that may be made applicable by the Government from time to time to the cadre of NCC WTLO.”

16. The aforesaid stipulation clearly provides that for the purpose of discipline and service liability, she would be governed by the Ministry of Defence letter dated 12.03.1997 and not in terms of the Office Memorandum No.F.No.11012/5/2016-Estt.A-III dated 02.08.2016, which was wrongly relied upon by this Court while passing the impugned order dated 16.12.2024.



17. During the course of the arguments, the position is not disputed that the non-applicant/petitioner was posted during the relevant time at Patna and the incident occurred at Patna, and therefore, on her complaint, ICC was convened by the Group Headquarters led by Brigadier/Colonel and on the submissions of the report/recommendations of the ICC dated 23.09.2023, the recommendation of the ICC was submitted to the State Directorate was in turn sent to the DG, NCC at the Command NCC Headquarters at Delhi in terms of the representation dated 14.02.2024 of the non-applicant/ petitioner.

18. In other words, the said hierarchy in the NCC has been followed in terms of the relevant NCC Act as well as the Rules. In the opinion of this Court, it is manifest that the NCC standing order of December, 1980 *vide* the Appendix 'A' which was relied upon by this Court is not applicable to the case of the non-applicant/petitioner. The said aspect was brought out in the reply to her RTI dated 03.07.2024 that it was the DGNCC who was the Disciplinary Authority as well as the Appellate Authority with respect to the Girls Division.

19. The position is inescapable that on the complaint lodged by the non-applicant/petitioner, it was the NCC Directorate at Bihar and Jharkhand that took a decision to refer the matter to constitution of ICC. It appears that there was an opposition cum request by the non-applicant/petitioner that the ICC be rather constituted at Delhi which was not accepted. Anyhow, she had participated in the ICC proceedings and eventually, the recommendation/report dated 23.09.2023 was submitted after according hearing to her.



20. At the cost of repetition, it was her own stand that she had made a representation to the DG, NCC dated 14.02.2024 and this Court directed that the same may be disposed of after affording hearing to the petitioner, as provided by the Section 18 of the POSH Act, 2013<sup>4</sup> and the rules thereunder.

21. At this juncture, it would be appropriate to refer to the provisions of section 18 of the POSH Act, which reads as under:

**SECTION 18. APPEAL-**(1) Any person aggrieved from the recommendations made under sub-section (2) of section 13 or under clause (i) or clause (ii) of sub-section (3) of section 13 or sub-section (1) or subsection (2) of section 14 or section 17 or non-implementation of such recommendations may prefer an appeal to the court or tribunal in accordance with the provisions of the service rules applicable to the said person or where no such service rules exist then, without prejudice to provisions contained in any other law for the time being in force, the person aggrieved may prefer an appeal in such manner as may be prescribed.

(2) The appeal under sub-section (1) shall be preferred within a period of ninety days of the recommendations.

22. Without further ado, the bottom line is that the plea canvassed by the learned counsel for the non-applicant/petitioner that the DG, NCC is not the Appellate Authority under Section 18 is belied from the circular dated 02.08.2016, which goes as under:-

“F. No. 11012/5/2016-Estt.A-III  
Government of India  
Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions  
Department of Personnel & Training  
Establishment Division

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North Block, New Delhi — 110001

Dated August 2, 2016

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<sup>4</sup> Prevention of Sexual Harassment (POSH) Act, 2013



## OFFICE MEMORANDUM

Subject: Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules 1965 -- Guidelines regarding prevention of sexual harassment of women at the workplace— regarding

Undersigned is directed to say that following enactment of the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 [SHWW (PPR) Act] and notification of the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Rules, 2013 [SHWW (PPR) Rules] on 09.12.2013, the Government notified the amendments to Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules 1964 and Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965. The amendments and other salient features of the Act/ Rules was brought to the notice of all concerned vide Office Memorandum No. 11013/02/2014-Estt.A-III dated 27.11.2014.

2. Section 18 (1) of the SHWW(PPR) Act, 2013 provides that any person aggrieved with the recommendations made under sub-section (2) of section 13 or under clause (i) or clause (ii) of sub-section (3) of section 13 or sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) of section 14 or section 17 or non-implementation of such recommendations may prefer an appeal to the court or tribunal in accordance with provisions of the service rules applicable to said person or where no such service rules exist then, without prejudice to the provisions contained in any other law for the time being in force, the person aggrieved may prefer an appeal in such manner as may be prescribed.

3. **In accordance with Section 18(1) of the SHWW (PPR) Act, 2013, it has been decided that in all cases of allegations of sexual harassment, the following procedure may be adopted:**

**Where a Complaint Committee has not recommended any action against the employee against whom the allegation have been made in a case involving allegations of sexual harassment, the Disciplinary Authority shall supply a copy of the Report of the Complaint Committee to the complainant and shall consider her representation, if any submitted, before coming to a final conclusion. The representation shall be deemed to be an appeal under section 18(1) of the Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013.**



4. All Ministries/Departments/Offices are requested to bring the above guidelines to the notice of all Disciplinary Authorities under their control. All cases, where final orders have not been issued may be processed as per these guidelines.
5. Hindi version will follow.

(Mukesh Chaturvedi)  
Director(E)  
Tele:23093176”

**{Bold portion emphasized}**

23. *A fortiori*, it is the disciplinary authority which acts as the appellate authority for considering the representation against the ICC under section 18 of the Act. The plea canvassed by the learned counsel for the non-applicant/petitioner that the DG, NCC is neither the Disciplinary Authority nor the Appellate Authority is absolutely misplaced. In fact, the plea advanced by learned Standing Counsel for the applicant/ respondent referring to the notification dated 09.06.1994 for the purposes of service & disciplinary matters in terms of section 40 of the NCC Act is also misplaced, which provision would apply to a punishment to a delinquent officer on being found guilty of any minor or major misconduct as defined under the relevant Rules.

24. There is no gainsaying that punishment in case of a proven charge of sexual harassment in terms of the recommendation of the ICC, would be required to be considered having regard to the nature of allegations proven, and only thereafter to be considered as either minor or major misconduct so as to be visited with appropriate punishment. Such punishment cannot be said to be limited or controlled *vide* Clauses (c) and (d) referred hereinabove in terms of the Circular No.15312/RTIA/1628/NCCHQ/Co-ord dated 03.07.2024.



25. Having said that, the patent blemish seems to be that although the non-applicant/petitioner demanded a personal hearing, the same was not afforded to her by the DG, NCC. Though learned standing counsel for the respondent submitted on instructions that an opportunity of hearing was afforded to the non-applicant/petitioner, she chose not to appear to present her case. It is difficult to countenance the plea advanced by the learned Standing Counsel for the applicant/respondent that the aforesaid circular dated 02.08.2016 w.r.t section 18 of the POSH Act does not envisage affording of personal hearing by the Appellate Authority, for the elementary reason that the Appellate Authority may after hearing the complainant, and for that matter, after hearing the delinquent official, may overturn the decision of the ICC and come to a different conclusion that may have been arrived at by the ICC.

26. Reference in this regard may be invited to the Report of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Human Resource Development on the Protection of Women Against Sexual Harassment at Work Place Bill, 2010, under the head 'Clause 18 : Appeal', wherein the Standing Committee observes that the proposed legislation provides that the right to appeal available to both the aggrieved complainant and the accused/delinquent stays in consonance with the principles of natural justice. The relevant portion of the Report of the Standing Committee reads as under:

“20.3...On the issue of appellate forum of court or tribunal, it was clarified by the Ministry that wherever Service Rules prescribed the Court of Law as an appellate forum, an appeal would be preferred before that court. Even in cases where Service Rules do not exist, a Court of Law may be prescribed as the appellate forum



through the Rules.

**20.4 The Committee while appreciating the concerns about likelihood of aggrieved woman as well as witnesses being made to face further harassment and uncalled for exposure in case of appeal being made in the Court or Tribunal would like to point out that principle of nature justice has to be adhered to in every case. Sexual harassment cases cannot be made an exception. The Committee would like to point out that with required steps and extra precaution taken by making the conduct of appeal proceedings in camera, chances of victims/witnesses facing undue harassment will not be there. It would also be better if onus of proving the case should be on the employer.**

20.5 So far as Supreme Court directives in Dr. Medha Kotwal case is concerned, the Committee observes that the proposed legislation envisages no further inquiry after the Report of the Complaints Committee has been given which would be mandatorily implemented by the employer. **However, the right to appeal to both to the aggrieved woman and the respondent stays in consonance with principles of natural justice.”**

**{bold emphasis supplied}**

27. In **Mangilal v. State of M.P.**<sup>5</sup>, the Supreme Court declared that even if a statute is silent and there are no positive words in the Act or the Rules made thereunder, the principles of natural justice must be observed. The relevant observations are reproduced herein:

“10. ... Where the statute is silent about the observance of the principles of natural justice, such statutory silence is taken to imply compliance with the principles of natural justice where substantial rights of parties are considerably affected. The application of natural justice becomes presumptive, unless found excluded by express words of statute or necessary intendment. (See *Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India*) Its aim is to secure justice or to prevent miscarriage of justice. Principles of natural justice do not supplant the law, but supplement it. These rules operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. They are a means to an end and not an end in themselves.”

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<sup>5</sup> (2004) 2 SCC 447



28. Furthermore, in a recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case titled **Aureliano Fernandes v. State of Goa**<sup>6</sup>, the apex Court made the following observations:

“77. The intent and purpose of the proviso inserted in Rule 14(2) of the CCS (CCA) Rules and Rule 3-C of the CCS (Conduct) Rules is that the procedure required to be adopted for conducting an inquiry into the complaint of sexual harassment that can lead to imposition of a major penalty under the Rules, must be fair, impartial and in line with the Rules. Pertinently, the emphasis on adhering to the principles of natural justice during an inquiry conducted by a Complaints Committee finds specific mention in Rule 7(4) of the subsequently enacted Rules of 2013. **But the spirit behind the due process could never be suppressed or ignored even in the absence of the Statute or the Rules inasmuch as the principles of natural justice are the very essence of the decision-making process and must be read into every judicial or even a quasi-judicial proceeding.**” {bold emphasis supplied}

29. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid case, further went on to emphasise the urgent need for strict enforcement of the POSH Act, highlighting that lapses on the part of Disciplinary Authorities under the CCS Rules in not following due process can lead to flawed decisions, eroding trust in the system and discouraging victims from reporting sexual harassment. The observations of the Supreme Court read as under:

“83. Just as we celebrate a decade of the PoSH Act being legislated, it is time to look back and take stock of the manner in which the mandate of the Act has been given effect to. The working of the Act is centred on the constitution of the Internal Complaints Committees (ICCs) by every employer at the workplace and constitution of Local Committees (LCs) and the Internal Committees (ICs) by the appropriate Government, as contemplated in Chapters II and III, respectively, of the PoSH Act. An improperly constituted ICC/LC/IC, would be an impediment in conducting an inquiry into a complaint of sexual harassment at the workplace, as envisaged under the Statute and the Rules. It will be

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<sup>6</sup> (2024) 1 SCC 632



equally counterproductive to have an ill prepared Committee conduct a half-baked inquiry that can lead to serious consequences, namely, imposition of major penalties on the delinquent employee, to the point of termination of service.

84. It is disquieting to note that there are serious lapses in the enforcement of the Act even after such a long passage of time. This glaring lacuna has been recently brought to the fore by a National daily newspaper that has conducted and published a survey of 30 national sports federations in the country and reported that 16 out of them have not constituted an ICC till date. Where the ICC have been found to be in place, they do not have the stipulated number of members or lack the mandatory external member. This is indeed a sorry state of affairs and reflects poorly on all the State functionaries, public authorities, private undertakings, organisations and institutions that are duty-bound to implement the PoSH Act in letter and spirit. Being a victim of such a deplorable act not only dents the self-esteem of a woman, it also takes a toll on her emotional, mental and physical health.

**85. It is often seen that when women face sexual harassment at the workplace, they are reluctant to report such misconduct. Many of them even drop out from their job. One of the reasons for this reluctance to report is that there is an uncertainty about who to approach under the Act for redressal of their grievance. Another is the lack of confidence in the process and its outcome. This social malady needs urgent amelioration through robust and efficient implementation of the Act. To achieve this, it is imperative to educate the complainant victim about the import and working of the Act. They must be made aware of how a complaint can be registered, the procedure that would be adopted to process the complaint, the objective manner in which the ICC/LC/IC is expected to function under the Statute, the nature of consequences that the delinquent employee can be visited with if the complaint is found to be true, the result of lodging a false or a malicious complaint and the remedies that may be available to a complainant if dissatisfied with the Report of the ICC/LC/IC, etc.**

86. However salutary this enactment may be, it will never succeed in providing dignity and respect that women deserve at the workplace unless and until there is strict adherence to the enforcement regime and a proactive approach by all the State and non-State actors. If the working environment continues to remain hostile, insensitive and unresponsive to the needs of women employees, then the Act will remain an empty formality. If the authorities/managements/employers cannot assure them a safe and secure workplace, they will fear stepping out of their homes to



make a dignified living and exploit their talent and skills to the hilt. It is, therefore, time for the Union Government and the State Governments to take affirmative action and make sure that the altruistic object behind enacting the PoSH Act is achieved in real terms.”  
**{bold emphasis supplied}**

30. In the light of above, in the considered opinion of this Court, Section 18 of the POSH Act, 2013 inheres in it a right to opportunity of personal hearing to be afforded to the complainant in case the ICC recommendation or report holds that there is no case of any act of sexual harassment on the part of the delinquent officer under section 13(2) of the POSH Act.

31. Faced with the aforesaid situation, on instructions it was stated at the Bar by the learned counsel for the applicant/respondent that the DG, NCC shall afford another opportunity of hearing to the non-applicant/petitioner on her representation and shall decide the matter in accordance with law.

32. All said and done, it has been rightly urged that if there is an issue of wrongful interpretation of the relevant rules, no contempt lies as it has to be shown that there has been a deliberate or wilful disobedience or the non-compliance of the directions of this Court.

### **RELIEF**

33. Resultantly, the present petition is allowed and the earlier order dated 16.12.2024 passed by this Court is hereby reviewed and recalled. The contempt petition is, accordingly, disposed of with a direction that the non-applicant/petitioner be afforded an opportunity of hearing based on her representation dated 14.02.2024, which was espoused in W.P.(C) No.2437/2024. The non applicant/petitioner shall



also be at liberty to submit an additional representation before the DG, NCC within two weeks from today, and thereafter, she be afforded an opportunity of hearing and the matter be decided in accordance with law.

34. The review petition, along with the pending application, is disposed of accordingly.

**DHARMESH SHARMA, J.**

**MARCH 24, 2025**

**Ch**